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Abstract: Two of the best senior 
artillery officers in the Canadian 
Army in the Second World War were 
products of the militia: William 
Ziegler (1911-1999) and Stanley 
Todd (1898-1996). Ziegler served 
as the senior artillery commander in 
1st Canadian Infantry Division in Italy 
from February 1944 until the end of 
the war. Todd was the senior gunner 
in 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
and the architect of the Canadian 
artillery fireplan on D-Day. He went on 
to serve as the senior gunner in 2nd 
Canadian Corps under Lieutenant-
General Guy Simonds. Both men 
talked with J.L. Granatstein in 1991 
and the transcript of those interviews 
offer their sometimes brutally frank 
appraisals of personalities and 
attitudes in the Second World War 
Canadian Army.
By general repute, two of the best senior artillery officers in the 
Canadian Army in the Second World 
War were William Ziegler (1911-1999) 
and Stanley Todd (1898-1996), both 
products of the militia. Ziegler had 
a dozen years of militia experience 
before the war, was a captain, and was 
in his third year studying engineering 
at the University of Alberta when 
his battery was mobilized in the 
first days of the war. Todd had 
attended the Royal Military College 
in a war-shortened course, leaving 
in 1916 for service with the Royal 
Artillery. He served in Britain and 
the Middle East and was invalided 
out of the service after contracting 
diphtheria. In business in Ottawa, he 
joined the NPAM artillery and was 
a lieutenant-colonel in 1939. Todd 
became Commander, Royal Artillery 
[CRA] in 3rd Canadian Division and 
Commander, Corps Royal Artillery 
[CCRA] in 2nd Canadian Corps. 
Ziegler was CRA in 1st Canadian 
Division. Both saw much action 
and had high – and deserved –
reputations.
I interviewed Todd at his home 
in Ancaster, Ontario in May 1991; 
Ziegler in Edmonton in October of 
the same year. The conversations 
covered personalities and attitudes 
and were sometimes brutally frank, 
which pleased me and suited my 
purposes as I did the research for The 
Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior 
Commanders in the Second World War 
(Toronto, 1993). As was my usual 
practice, I made notes as we talked 
and then wrote up a memoranda 
of each conversation, both of which 
– with minor editing and some 
deletions – follow. Copies of these 
and all the interview memoranda 
that I prepared are in my papers at 
the York University Archives while 
another set is held by the Directorate 
of History and Heritage at National 
Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. 
Brigadier William S. Ziegler, 
interviewed at Edmonton, 
23 October 1991
Born in 1911, Ziegler had wanted to attend RMC but couldn’t get 
in. He joined the 61st Field Battery 
of the Non-Permanent Active Militia 
in 1926 in Edmonton as a boy soldier, 
got his commission in 193[2], and in 
the summer of 1938 was attached 
to the Permanent Force [PF] as an 
instructor and captain. There he 
mastered technical gunnery and 
became an expert, well-positioned 
to rise when the war started. He 
went overseas in early 1940 with 
the 8th Field Regiment and was sent 
back to Canada to be brigade major 
(Artillery) with the 3rd Canadian 
Division. He attended Camberley 
Staff College where he was told he 
should try to stand first of the ten 
Canadians there and not to worry 
about the 190 others. He placed 
second, Dan Spry [later a division 
commander] beating him out. He 
then became GSO1 Artillery at First 
Canadian Army, commanding officer 
of 13th Field Regiment, a colonel at 
Canadian Military Headquarters, 
and in February 1944 a brigadier and 
Commander, Royal Artillery [CRA] 
of 1st Canadian Division in Italy in 
which post he stayed to the end of the 
war. In 1946 he went to work for the 
Allied Control Commission and was 
governor of a province in northern 
Germany for five years.
I asked about his impressions of 
the PF. He was not overly impressed 
by PF quality. There were princes 
(Major-General H.O.N. Brownfield), 
terrific soldiers (Major-General Chris 
Vokes), and others who had to be 
sacked. Still, when he was president 
of a corporation he had to sack people 
too. The army was a cross-section. 
Bert Hoffmeister would have been 
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a leader even if there had not been 
a war. Guy Simonds was a man of 
such quality as to be unusual in any 
army – even when he first met him 
at a Royal School in 1931-2 you knew 
he wasn’t to be trifled with. So was 
Bernard Montgomery, though he was 
a little SOB. The PF’s problem was 
slow promotion: at the end of the 
war he was offered a regular army 
commission as a brigadier but he 
refused because he thought he could 
look forward to one promotion only, 
so he got out….
When he went overseas, his 
regiment was billeted with the 11th 
from Toronto (with Bruce Matthews 
[later a division commander]). There 
was initially no mixing between the 
officers, and the westerners thought 
the Toronto officers were snobs. 
But after a large party where all got 
hammered together, their training 
was comparable. He added that his 
regiment had no guns initially (this 
was before Dunkirk) so he devised 
mock-ups out of timber and they 
practised on those.
He had high regard for General 
McNaughton and told a story of 
training at Larkhill where they 
were using a new artillery board for 
plotting. He was leaning over a board 
when he heard a voice from behind: 
“What’s the trouble?” “I don’t know, 
but if I ever get hold of the SOB that 
designed this board….” It was, of 
course, McNaughton, and it was his 
board. McNaughton just laughed. 
Still, Andy’s problem was that he 
couldn’t deal with the Brits. He was 
OK as a trainer, though perhaps he 
had been weak in preparing senior 
officers. After all, he was green 
like all the Canadians. And, yes, 
he was, while good technically, 
weaker in higher command skills. 
He wasn’t a presence and saw troops 
infrequently.
Basil Price who commanded 3rd 
Division was a grand old fellow, 
lovable, a person you’d like as a 
grandfather. It was hard for him to 
bawl out anyone. These were not 
compliments, said Ziegler. Price 
was one of the “old dugouts” and it 
wasn’t until the fighting began that 
they disappeared. Still, there was no 
option until 1942 or so, and the blame 
is not the “dugouts” but Canada’s 
for stripping its military after 1919. 
He said the result would have been 
chaos if McNaughton, Price, and [2nd 
Division GOC Major-General Victor] 
Odlum had had to lead the army into 
action, though the sprinkling of good 
Brigadier W.S. Ziegler, the acting commander of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, follows behind General Harry Crerar during an 
inspection. The officers on the left are Majors P. Potvin and Y. Dubé of the Royal 22e Régiment, Utrecht, Netherlands, 10 July 1945.
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staff officers under them might have 
helped. If they’d been smart, they 
would have left the fighting to their 
GSO1s. They did their best but they 
were no good.
When he arrived at 1st Cdn Div 
as CRA, he thought the artillery was 
stuck in the mud – literally. He knew 
Bruce Matthews, his predecessor, 
was a Simonds and Vokes favourite, 
but it was inevitable that artillery 
was suffering through a hard post-
Ortona winter dug into gun pits and 
a bit slack on shaving, etc. He hauled 
COs over the coals, ordered the guns 
cleaned and, he says, restored morale.
Vokes init ial ly was pretty 
unhappy with him, thinking that 
Ziegler’s new broom was a criticism 
of Matthews. He had only met Vokes 
briefly before, and Vokes hadn’t 
wanted Matthews to leave. If he had 
to go, Vokes had wanted Jack Ross, 
a PF CO in 1st Cdn Div, to get the 
job. Instead, as Brownfield, Brigadier 
Royal Artillery of First Cdn Army, 
made the appointment (and Ziegler 
clearly was a Brownfield favourite), 
he got the nod – and worse, came 
from the UK. Moreover, Ziegler wore 
glasses so, to Vokes, he couldn’t be 
a soldier. He was in the doghouse 
for a miserable period of weeks that 
lasted until the Hitler Line attacks in 
May 1944. Ziegler had had a month 
to train his regiments and he drove 
them hard. His artillery fire plan was 
massive, double the El Alamein scale, 
and he’d worked it out over a 72-hour 
straight stretch. Then Vokes wanted 
it changed in mid-battle and gruffly 
said he supposed it couldn’t be done. 
But with only a 3-hour pause Ziegler 
switched direction. Vokes then called 
Ziegler into his dugout and insisted 
he have a full tumbler of whiskey. 
“Goddammit, Ziegler, don’t you 
understand English, a real drink.” 
Ziegler passed out and later realized 
that Vokes knew he was out on his 
feet with fatigue. From that moment, 
he worshipped Vokes and became to 
Vokes “the best goddam CRA in the 
Canadian Army.”
He thought it was natural for 
Vokes to favour the PF. But even so, 
under his veneer he was not a tough 
guy. He was a real human being. 
He wasn’t gunshy and he always 
went forward, taking Ziegler along 
in his jeep. Often they had to hide in 
ditches together under fire. He was 
a good planner, left Ziegler alone to 
do his work and his Commander, 
Royal Engineers too (which, as Vokes 
was RCE must have been hard). He 
could decentralize command. While 
he was no brilliant tactician, he was 
certainly adequate. Moreover, the 
troops worshipped him. He recalled 
one morning coming across some 
Hasty Pees [Hastings and Prince 
Edward Regiment] looking at dead 
comrades. Vokes stopped the jeep. 
“Don’t bloody look at them. Get out 
your spades and bury the stiffs.” 
They did. The soldiers had been 
ready to vomit, but Vokes got 
them moving and raised their 
morale. He could also crack jokes 
with troops, unlike Simonds. But 
in the [1st Cdn Div] “A” Mess, it 
was always “Sir” and “Ziegler” 
or once in a while “Bill.”
He recal led that  when 
Vokes left as commander of the 
Occupation Force in Germany, 
he told Ziegler, staying with 
the Allied Control Commission 
in Lower Saxony that he could 
have his alcohol. Ziegler expected 
a case or two; instead a 3-ton 
truckload arrived….
He had little regard for 
Foulkes and no respect for him. 
Ziegler’s heart bled for Vokes 
when he didn’t get the 1 Cdn 
Corps, and Vokes was livid. There 
was no way he could serve under 
Foulkes so he and [4th Cdn Armd 
Div’s Major-General Harry] 
Foster switched. If Ziegler could 
have he would have left with Vokes. 
Ziegler had known Foulkes since 
1941 when, as a lieutenant-colonel 
he had been on ship with Ziegler. 
Even then he was unapproachable. 
Was he able? A corps commander 
in Italy had to leave most things to 
division commanders, and at his first 
major fight on the Lamone River the 
Corps had a setback. Foulkes was 
angry and sacked Brigadier [J.A.] 
Calder [commanding 1st Brigade in 
1st Cdn Div], making him, Ziegler 
said, the scapegoat. That cemented 
feeling against Foulkes in the Corps 
and Ziegler never heard a good word 
about him from anyone. He also 
drank too much, once turning up 
drunk to open a recreation club. He 
thought [General Harry] Crerar had 
a lot to do with Foulkes’ rise.
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Brigadier Ziegler takes a salute 
during a parade in Dordrecht, 
Netherlands, 7 June 1945.
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We then talked about Foster and 
Hoffmeister. 1st Cdn Div suffered 
under Foster. Not that he was evil: 
he just wasn’t Vokes. Nothing he 
did stuck in Ziegler’s memory. They 
got on well, there were no problems, 
and he handled his battles well. But 
it wasn’t the same. Hoffmeister he 
thought the most brilliant division 
commander to emerge from the 
NPAM. As good as any PFer, a 
natural leader, a helluva soldier, 
skillful, bold and well thought of 
by his CRAs. Why? He knew the 
capacity of the infantry and knew 
how they could operate with the 
other arms. He thought circumstance 
had put him in position to show his 
ability. If the Seaforths had not been 
in 1st Cdn Div, if 1st Div hadn’t gone 
to Sicily, etc., etc., Hoffmeister might 
have remained untried….
Brigadier P.A.S. Todd, 
interviewed at Ancaster, ON, 
8 May 1991
The prewar Militia, Todd said, was very tiny. His artillery regiment 
in Ottawa had just enough for four 
gun crews, but there was a lot of 
education going on in the training 
of officers and NCOs. He spoke 
about the Militia Staff Course which 
was an 8 month commitment of 
evenings and a month off work in 
the summer for full time. He spoke 
too of meeting many of those who 
became the wartime senior officers 
at Petawawa….
We then talked about Harry 
Crerar who Todd knew in Ottawa and 
with whom he was then on first name 
basis. He found him a well-trained, 
slow, serious man who, he doubts, 
ever laughed. He did a military 
appreciation on everything he had 
to think about, took his time and 
came up with the right answers….He 
was an excellent officer, 100 percent 
sound and very real, but one problem 
was that it took too long for people to 
get to know him.
Major-General Chris Vokes (left), the 
commander of 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division, was not happy when Ziegler was 
appointed as his artillery commander. 
Ziegler had three strikes against him: 
Vokes had wanted a different PF man 
for the job, he was militia, and he was 
being posted from England. They were 
able to work out their differences to the 
point where Ziegler worshipped Vokes 
and Vokes considered Ziegler “the best 
goddam CRA in the Canadian Army.”
Brigadier P.A.S. Todd (second from left), CCRA 2nd Canadian Corps, inspects captured German artillery at Meppen, Germany, 
31 May 1945. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, the commander of 2nd Canadian Corps sits in the passenger seat of the jeep.
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Certainly Crerar fought with 
Bernard Montgomery who greatly 
favoured Guy Simonds….He got 
Montgomery’s back up, like General 
McNaughton, by trying to get into 
Sicily which was Monty’s show. 
When Crerar finally got into action, 
Simonds was already there and 
favoured. What this meant, he said, 
was that Monty bypassed First 
Canadian Army to give orders 
directly to Simonds’ 2nd Canadian 
Corps in Northwest Europe. He 
recalled phone calls for Simonds that 
were “yes sir, right away,” followed 
by stalling and obfuscation when 
Crerar tried to find out what was up.
The root of the Crerar-Simonds 
problem was that they were both 
artillery. Simonds from his 6’ 2” 
looked down on Crerar as a stuffy 
old man, while Crerar saw him as an 
upstart to be put in his place. Crerar’s 
stability led him to take a dim view 
of Simonds….
He knew McNaughton socially in 
Ottawa and had his sons in his Militia 
unit. He also served on his staff as 
BRA [Brigadier, Royal Artillery] 
briefly. He was a good man in the 
wrong place. For a start, training 
under him was elementary….
McNaughton had been a good officer 
in World War I but he doubted he’d 
ever spent much time on tactics….
There was no question of his brains 
or dedication, but he would do things 
himself rather than sending his staff. 
His weaknesses weren’t seen then, 
however, and he was considered a 
great man from whom great things 
were expected. Todd was BRA 
when Andy was sacked in 1943. He 
remembered that the six brigadiers 
[of First Canadian Army HQ] sat in 
“A Mess” while Colonel Ralston [the 
Minister of National Defence] was 
doing the deed upstairs in a bedroom. 
He had no doubt that Crerar made 
a better Army commander than 
McNaughton.
Simonds, of course, would have 
been better yet. He knew him before 
the war from Petawawa and disliked 
him intensely – snooty, snobbish, 
etc. And this continued with the 
war….He felt strongly enough 
about this that when he and Bruce 
Matthews were made brigadiers on 
the same day he took 3rd Div CRA 
and Matthews 1st Div just so Todd 
wouldn’t have to work with him. 
But he couldn’t avoid him in late 
1944 when Simonds summoned him 
to Corps HQ and announced that 
Matthews was promoted to major-
general and Todd was the new 
CCRA….He grew to admire him 
enormously as a commander. He 
and Brian Horrocks were the best. He 
could be ruthless in getting where he 
wanted to go; if something held him 
up he’d sack people until someone 
was there to do what he wanted. 
The tactical ideas he produced were 
almost certainly his own, the product 
of long nights thinking in his caravan. 
He went to sleep about 0100 and 
was up at about 0600 to go off in his 
armoured car. Simonds also was at 
the start line for big attacks to make 
sure things went well, and he was 
not beyond pushing and pulling 
the infantry to make sure they got 
moving. But Todd said this caused 
him problems, for Simonds wanted 
his CCRA with him rather than at 
HQ where all his communications 
were….
Simonds almost never questioned 
Todd’s artillery plans. He’d derive 
his appreciation and make his plan 
and then ask Todd to tell him how 
the artillery could help achieve it. 
He recalled an attack on Emmerich 
where the River Rhine makes a sharp 
turn west. Simonds had to attack 
on a Friday and Todd had to soften 
up the hill that was the heart of the 
enemy position. He worked out a 
system of dividing the hill into 100-
yd squares and then put one gun on 
each square to fire four shells per 
hour at irregular intervals. Simonds 
questioned this and ordered a Victor 
target – every gun in the Corps, 
despite Todd’s protests. After a day, 
Todd’s system went back on. The 
attack went in without opposition, 
the Germans putting up white flags. 
Why? The continuous shelling had 
stopped food, sleep, etc. Simonds 
then apologized to Todd and after 
that never altered his plans….
We talked about D-Day. Todd 
had been preparing for this for 17 
months as CRA 3rd Cdn Div. He had 
to retrain his gunners on armoured 
105s (scrapped after the invasion 
when the Canadians went back to 
25-pounders; Simonds then used 
the “Priests” as armoured personnel 
carriers), had to design the run in to 
shore, and had to learn to fire from 
the sea, difficult because guns need 
aiming sticks, survey, etc. But he had 
time….
Then we got into Rod Keller 
[GOC 3rd Cdn Div]. He was a bluff, 
hearty man, a bully, someone who 
Brigadier P.A.S. Todd
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would always say he didn’t care what 
X or Y thought. He had a difficult 
marriage, and he had a girlfriend in 
London, married to a Royal Marines 
officer. On occasion Todd had to 
ensure that the officer, apparently 
attached to the Canadians, was 
assigned to weekend duty so Keller 
had a free hand.
He was also yellow, [“Keller 
was yeller”]. Foolish too. During 
the D-Day planning, the planners 
were housed in row houses near 
Victoria Station [in London], under 
tight security. Keller managed to get 
out of the buildings, where all were 
supposed to stay 24 hours, and to a 
hotel…Within moments of reaching 
the hotel, Keller was out in civvies. 
Then on the Isle of Wight, Keller 
and Todd lived with the Royal Navy 
admiral who was to carry them in. 
After a short period, the Admiral’s 
#2 came to see Todd privately to say 
they were disturbed by his general; 
Todd said he could say nothing 
without being disloyal and if the RN 
was unhappy it should go through 
channels. Then the three brigadiers 
in the division – Cunningham, 
Blackader, and Foster – came to see 
him with their complaints, mainly 
that Keller was never around and that 
his GSO1, J.D. Mingay, was running 
things. Again Keller gave then the 
loyalty argument and, to me, used the 
word mutiny. In fact, the complaints 
were true. Mingay was a brilliant staff 
officer who did run things; when he 
had a problem, he and Todd (“Uncle 
Stanley” – he was in his 40s and older 
than almost everyone else) worked 
them out. In effect, Mingay and 
Todd ran the division, Keller signing 
everything put in front of him.
Once ashore in France, the yellow 
showed. His caravan was dug in 
and he stayed in it. When he was 
wounded in the USAAF bombing, he 
whimpered and moaned from his two 
small wounds. There was apparently 
great relief for all when he was taken 
away….Why did no one twig to this 
earlier? He had a long conversation 
about this with Simonds before his 
death who said that when Brig. 
Cunningham was sacked, he had 
wanted to overturn it first because he 
was an RMC classmate and second 
because he had no confidence in 
Keller’s judgment. Then why did he 
not move against Keller? Again no 
answer.
Spry succeeded Keller. He was 
very young indeed but he was an 
excellent GOC. Todd couldn’t judge 
his tactical skills but he was a great 
change from Keller and wasn’t 
frightened….The next spring when 
J.L. Granatstein is the author of the second 
edition of Canada’s Army: Waging War and 
Keeping the Peace (University of Toronto 
Press, 2011).
3rd Div put in a brigade attack, 
Simonds was at the start line and 
Spry wasn’t. The attack was a mess, 
and Simonds went back to Spry’s 
HQ where he and his CRA were 
asleep, after an all-night poker game. 
Simonds sacked him on the spot and 
the CRA too….He attributed Spry’s 
problem to inexperience. He was just 
a kid…..
Todd had strong opinions about his commanders. He respected Crerar and Simonds, 
thought McNaughton was a good man in the wrong place and considered Rod Keller, 
commander of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, yellow, foolish and a bully. He believed that 
Dan Spry, Keller’s replacement, was a good commander, but young and inexperienced.
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
Ar
ch
iv
es
 C
an
ad
a 
PA
 1
97
18
4
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/8
